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Postpartum Psychosis and the Insanity
Defense
John Dentt
In April of 1987, Sheryl Lynn Massip killed her six-week old
son by striking him over the head with a blunt instrument and
then driving a car over him.1 At her trial eighteen months later,
she argued that her actions resulted from postpartum psychosis, a
severe mental disorder afflicting some mothers in the months fol-
lowing childbirth.2 A California jury rejected her insanity plea and
convicted her of second-degree murder. The trial judge, however,
set aside the jury verdict, reduced the charge to voluntary man-
slaughter, and then found her not guilty by reason of insanity.'
While the defense of temporary insanity is generally available
in criminal prosecutions," its usefulness to the class of defendants
consisting of women who have killed their babies within months of
birth is questionable. This is due in part to the rigorous standard
of proof imposed by some jurisdictions on defendants claiming
temporary insanity. Certain jurisdictions require that, in order to
prevail in the defense, the defendant must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that she did not know the nature of her ac-
tions when she caused the death at issue. But for the small class of
homicide defendants with whom this comment is concerned, even
proving the influence over the defendant of a recognized psycho-
logical disorder with known symptoms and a relatively particular-
ized period of occurrence may not suffice to meet this burden.
Ironically, the evidence presented in support of the insanity claims
of these defendants consists of results from psychological analy-
ses-exams that might often prevent the very crimes for which
these defendants are charged.
t B.A. 1984, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. Candidate 1990, University of
Chicago.
Eric Lichtblau, Baby-Death Conviction Thrown Out; Judge Rules Massip Was In-
sane When She Ran Over Son, LA Times 1 (Dec 24, 1988).
2 Laurence Kruckman and Chris Asmann-Finch, Postpartum Depression: A Research
Guide and International Bibliography xv (Garland Publishing, 1986).
3 Lichtblau, LA Times at 1 (cited in note 1).
4 See generally Wayne R. LeFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law, § 4.1 at 304-
410 (West, 2d ed 1986).
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This comment uses California as a model jurisdiction to ex-
amine the particular problems facing postpartum psychosis victims
who try to build an insanity defense upon evidence of the disease.
California has rejected modern insanity tests in favor of a more
restrictive traditional test incorporating an exacting standard of
proof. The law in California typifies the national skepticism toward
the insanity defense, a skepticism that has increased dramatically
in the last decade.
Part I of this comment will examine the contours of the in-
sanity defense in California and describe the frequency and symp-
toms of postpartum psychosis. Part II will summarize the successes
and failures of the insanity defense when claimed by women alleg-
edly suffering from the psychosis. In response to the unique
problems of proof encountered by these women, Part III proposes
reducing the burden of proof imposed on such defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND POSTPARTUM
PSYCHOSIS
A. The Insanity Defense: A Historical Overview
At common law, the "M'Naghten test" has governed the in-
sanity defense for over a century. Under this test, a showing of
insanity has two components.' First, the defendant must prove
that she was unable to appreciate the nature of her act or to differ-
entiate between right and wrong at the time of the act. This is the
"cognitive" prong of the M'Naghten standard. Second, she must
show that this inability was the result of a "mental disease or de-
fect." This component of the test is left largely to the intuition of
the jury; moreover, because jury instructions typically do not de-
fine or explain what constitutes a "mental disease," it seems that
"any mental abnormality, be it psychosis, neurosis, organic brain
disorder, or congenital intellectual deficiency (low IQ or feeble-
mindedness), will suffice if it has caused the consequences de-
scribed in the second part of the test."' 7
Id at 304.
The court in M'Naghten stated that a criminal defendant can be excused of criminal
responsibility for his actions if:
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong."
Daniel M'Naghten's Case, House of Lords, 10 Cl & F 200, 210, 8 Eng Rep 718 (1843).
LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, § 4.2(b)(1) at 312-13 (cited in note 4).
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One hundred and twenty years after the introduction of the
M'Naghten test, the American Law Institute ("ALI") rejected the
common law standard in its Model Penal Code.' The drafters
made two major changes intended to broaden the scope of the in-
sanity defense beyond that of M'Naghten. Rather than requiring
an absolute inability to determine right from wrong, the Model Pe-
nal Code requires only that the defendant lack "substantial capac-
ity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct."9 The Code addi-
tionally provides an alternative "volitional" test to the M'Naghten
"cognitive" prong for "cases in which mental disease or defect de-
stroys or overrides the defendant's power of self-control."10 Under
the volitional prong, a defendant can claim insanity if the mental
disease or defect rendered her unable to conform her conduct to
the requirements of the law, even if she could substantially appre-
ciate the criminality of her conduct.1
The Model Penal Code's formulation of an insanity test was
tremendously influential and widely adopted either by statute or
by judicial decision.' 2 The popularity of the Code's more lenient
standard, however, was short-lived. The movement away from it
began in 1981, following John Hinckley's attempt to assassinate
Model Penal Code § 4.01 reads as follows:
§ 4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
American Law Institute, 1 Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Re-
vised Comments) 163 (1985).
' Model Penal Code § 4.01(1). The commentary to § 4.01(1) notes that M'Naghten:
authorizes a finding of responsibility in a case in which the actor is not seriously
deluded concerning his conduct or its consequences, but in which the actor's ap-
preciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct is a largely detached or abstract
awareness that does not penetrate to the affective level.
Id at 166.
'0 Id at 167.
" Id at 168. The drafters felt that "no test is workable that calls for complete impair-
ment of ability to know or to control." Id at 171.
" In 1979, the American Law Institute assessed the impact of its formulation:
The great majority of states with revised codes incorporating statutory tests have
chosen the Model Code's approach in preference to traditional standards, and so
also have several other states. Some states have accepted its approach by judicial
decision, and ten of the eleven federal courts of appeals have approved all or most
of the formulation for their circuits.
Id at 175-76 (footnotes omitted).
3551
358 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1989:
President Reagan. Hinckley was acquitted by a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI"),3 prompting calls to reform
or abolish the insanity defense.14 Many of the courts and legisla-
tures that previously had adopted the ALI test modified or aban-
doned it. Congress expressly reinstituted the M'Naghten standard
in cases involving federal offenses.15 Some jurisdictions kept the
I3 United States v Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D DC 1982). The decision is unre-
ported. For a summary of the facts and issues, see United States v Hinckley, 525 F Supp
1342 (D DC 1981), and 672 F2d 115'(DC Cir 1982), affirming the trial court decision; both
decisions concern pretrial motions.
" For a summary of some of the legislative, judicial, and academic reactions to the
insanity defense after the Hinckley trial, see David Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Prob-
lem, 53 Geo Wash L Rev 528 (1985).
See also United States v Torniero, 570 F Supp 721, 722-23 (D Conn 1983), in which the
government argued that the insanity defense serves no legitimate purpose of the criminal
justice system, and that the practical consequences of the defense include the unsupervised
release of some dangerous individuals from any form of governmental control or restraint;
the sapping of public confidence in the nation's courts; the presentation of expert testimony
in a setting that robs psychiatrists and other specialists of their credibility and undermines
the value of their professional judgments; and the proliferation of endless new varieties of
mental illness, asserted as defenses in ever more unlikely cases. Although the court found
the government's concerns genuine, it held that the relief sought was "sweeping and unprec-
edented" and could not be granted.
Some commentators suggest abolishing the insanity defense but continuing to allow evi-
dence of abnormal mental condition for the sole purpose of negating criminal intent. See,
for example, Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law (University of Chicago Press,
1982).
1 18 USC § 17 (1984) provides:
§ 17. Insanity defense
(a) Affirmative defense.-It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under
any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting
the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of proof.-The defendant has the burden of proving the defense
of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 17 was passed in 1984 as Public Law 98-473. To support the elimination of the
volitional prong, the legislative history cites approvingly the testimony of Richard J. Bonnie,
Professor of Law at the University of Virginia:
[T]here is no scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for self-control or
for calibrating the impairment of such capacity .... Whatever the precise terms
of the volitional test, the question is unanswerable-or can be answered only by
"moral guesses." To ask it at all, in my opinion, invites fabricated claims, under-
mines equal administration of the penal law, and compromises its deterrent effect.
The Insanity Defense, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Sen-
ate, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (1982), cited in 1983 USCCAN 3182, 3408-09.
The statute has two notable features. First, the mental disease or defect must be "se-
vere." "[N]onpsychotic behavior disorders or neuroses such as an 'inadequate personality,'
'immature personality,' or a pattern of 'antisocial tendencies' do not constitute the defense."
1983 USCCAN at 3411. Second, the defendant must prove insanity by "clear and convincing
evidence," a standard beyond even that requiring a preponderance of the evidence. The
Committee stated that "a more rigorous requirement than proof by a preponderance of the
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"substantial capacity" test, but eliminated the volitional prong.16
Others incorporated the oft-criticized "guilty but mentally ill" ver-
dict.17 And Montana, Idaho, and Utah abolished the insanity de-
fense altogether."
California also embraced, then rejected the ALI standard.
Before 1979, California followed the common law M'Naghten
test. 19 The California Supreme Court had developed, as an overlay
evidence is necessary to assure that only those defendants who plainly satisfy the require-
ments of the defense are exonerated from what is otherwise culpable criminal behavior." Id
at 3412.
" See, for example, 17-A Me Rev Stat Ann § 39 (1985); 1 Tex Penal Code Ann § 8.01
(Vernon 1983); 12 Alaska Stat § 12.47.010 (1982).
17 See, for example, 11 Del Code Ann § 401b (1982) (retaining the cognitive prong for
NGRI, but eliminating the volitional prong except in cases of guilty but mentally ill
("GBMI") verdicts), and Ill Rev Stat ch 38, § 6-2(c), (d) and (e) (1984). The Illinois statute
retains the ALI standard for mental disease or defect, but adds the GBMI verdict for a
person who "was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness." Mental illness is de-
fined as a "substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the
time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment, but not
to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior or is unable to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." The statute also shifted the burden of
proof on the insanity issue to the defendant, using a preponderance standard.
For a summary of the status and criticism of the GBMI verdict, see Bradley McGraw,
Diana Farthing-Capowich and Ingo Keilitz, The "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Plea and Ver-
dict: Current State of the Knowledge, 30 Vill L Rev 117 (1985). The American Bar Associa-
tion has recommended that "[sitatutes which supplant or supplement the verdict of guilty
but mentally ill should not be enacted." ABA Standing Committee on Association Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice, First Tentative Draft: Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards
295 (1983) (Standard 7-6.10(b)). The accompanying commentary explained:
The "guilty but mentally ill" verdict offers no help in the difficult question of
assessing a defendant's criminal responsibility. This determination in insanity
cases is essentially a moral judgment. If in fact the defendant is so mentally dis-
eased or defective as to be not criminally responsible for the offending act, it
would be morally obtuse to assign criminal liability. The "guilty but mentally ill"
verdict also lacks utility in the forward looking determination regarding disposi-
tion. Guilty defendants should be found guilty. Disposition questions, including
questions concerning the appropriate form of correctional treatment, should be
handled by the sentencing tribunal and by correctional authorities. Enlightened
societal self-interest suggests that all felony convicts should receive professional
mental health and mental retardation screening and that, whenever indicated,
those convicts should receive mental health therapy. Identifying convicts in need
of such treatment or rehabilitation and following up that identification process
with actual treatment has nothing to do with the form of the verdict.
Id at 297.
" Mont Code Ann § 46-14-102 (1983); Utah Code Ann § 76-2-305(1) (1983 Supp);
Idaho Code § 18-207(a), (c) (1982). The Idaho Code, for example, provides: "Mental condi-
tion shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct." Of course, a defendant in
these jurisdictions can still argue that she lacked the necessary mens rea to commit the
crime. See Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law (cited in note 14).
11 People v Coffman, 24 Cal 230 (1864); People v Hoin, 62 Cal 120 (1882); People v
Daugherty, 40 Cal 2d 876, 894, 256 P2d 911 (1953).
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to the M'Naghten standard, the doctrine of diminished capacity.
Unlike insanity, diminished capacity is not a complete defense;
rather, it reduces the grade of a homicide charge from murder to
manslaughter on the theory that the defendant lacked the ability
to form the requisite intent to murder.20 In 1979, the California
Supreme Court adopted the Model Penal Code's insanity test.21
But three years later, reacting to the Hinckley acquittal and the
controversial diminished capacity defense of Dan White,22 Califor-
nians passed a voter initiative that reinstituted the M'Naghten
standard and specifically abolished the doctrine of diminished ca-
pacity." California thus requires today that to claim insanity a de-
30 See People v Wells, 33 Cal 2d 330, 202 P2d 53 (1949); People v Gorshen, 51 Cal 2d
716, 336 P2d 492 (1959); and People v Conley, 64 Cal 2d 310, 411 P2d 911, 914, 49 Cal Rptr
815 (1966) ("[iut has long been settled that evidence of diminished mental capacity ... can
be used to show that a defendant did not have a specific mental state essential to an
offense").
" The court adopted the ALI test without waiting for legislative action because of the
ALI test's "manifest superiority":
[Tihe continuing inadequacy of M'Naghten as a test of criminal responsibility
cannot be cured by further attempts to interpret language dating from a different
era of psychological thought .... It is time to recast M'Naghten in modern lan-
guage, taking account of advances in psychological knowledge and changes in legal
thought.
People v Drew, 22 Cal 3d 333, 583 P2d 1318, 1324-25, 149 Cal Rptr 275 (1979).
" White successfully reduced his murder charge to manslaughter by claiming that high
levels of sugar in his bloodstream-the result of eating too much junk food-had rendered
him incapable of forming an intent to murder. People v White, Cr 19961 (Super Ct, San
Fran) (unreported decision), aff'd on procedural grounds, 117 Cal App 3d 270, 172 Cal Rptr
612 (1981). For a summary of the case and the resulting public outcry, see Comment, The
Diminished Capacity Defense in California; An Idea Whose Time Has Gone?, 3 Glendale L
Rev 311 (1979).
" California Penal Code § 25 provides:
§ 25. Diminished capacity, insanity; evidence; amendment of [this] section
(a) The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal ac-
tion, as well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused per-
son's intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissi-
ble to show or negate capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive,
malice aforethought, knowledge, or other mental state required for the commis-
sion of the crime charged.
(b) In any criminal proceeding, including any juvenile court proceeding, in
which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be
found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the
nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the
time of the commission of the offense.
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, evidence of diminished capacity or of a
mental disorder may be considered by the court only at the time of sentencing or
other disposition or commitment.
(d) The provisions of this section shall not be amended by the Legislature
except by statute passed in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-
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fendant must show that she is unable either to distinguish right
from wrong or to understand the nature of her act.
B. Postpartum Psychosis
Postpartum psychosis is one end of a spectrum of behaviors
generically described as "postpartum depression" ("PPD")2 4 This
spectrum can be divided into three classes of behaviors.2 5 The most
common of these is the so-called "baby blues," a mild depression
and anxiety experienced by roughly half of all new mothers in the
first week after childbirth.2 6 A less common, intermediate reaction,
called chronic depressive syndrome, is characterized by more acute
and long-lasting depression. It strikes approximately 3% to 20%
of mothers and can last over a year.28 The rarest and most extreme
thirds of the membership concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective only
when approved by the electors.
Cal Penal Code § 25 (West 1988).
Unlike both the traditional M'Naghten formulation and the Model Penal Code ap-
proach, the California insanity test does not require a "mental disease or defect." This is
consistent with the formulation that had been used by California courts before Drew, 583
P2d 1318. According to its literal reading, the statute requires that the defendant be unable
both to distinguish right from wrong and to understand the nature of her act. The tradi-
tional M'Naghten formulation requires only one or the other. In People v Skinner, 39 Cal
3d 765, 704 P2d 752, 217 Cal Rptr 685 (1985), however, the California Supreme Court read
the "and" as an "or," ruling that the California voters had intended only to reinstitute the
M'Naghten test rather than to change M'Naghten itself:
Had it been the intent of the drafters of Proposition 8 or of the electorate which
adopted it both to abrogate the more expansive ALI-Drew test and to abandon
that prior fundamental principle of culpability for crime, we would anticipate that
this intent would be expressed in some more obvious manner than the substitu-
tion of a single conjunctive in a lengthy initiative proposition.
Id at 776. The court also noted that any other reading might raise constitutional problems.
Id.
" Kruckman and Asmann-Finch, Postpartum Depression at xiii (cited in note 2).
Kruckman and Asmann-Finch compiled a list of over 650 medical journal articles and books
on postpartum depression, finding that "[m]ost research and treatment of postpartum de-
pression has focused on the more serious psychotic reactions." Id at xxviii. This voluminous
literature "shows the overwhelming emphasis on biological explanations based on the global
hormonal changes occurring postpartum." Id.
" Id at xiv.
"' Some studies suggest the incidence of "baby blues" in new mothers may be as high
as 80%. Id at xxxi. Symptoms include frequent and prolonged crying, irritability, poor sleep,
mood changes, and a sense of vulnerability that may continue for several weeks. Id at xv.
7 Symptoms include despondency, tearfulness, feelings of inadequacy, guilt, anxiety,
irritability, and fatigue. Id.
2 Id at xxxi. The frequency of this intermediate form of postpartum depression is par-
ticularly uncertain because it has been studied only recently. Id at xv. The literature often
uses the general term "postpartum depression" to describe this particular class. See, for
example, Michael Garvey and Gary Tollefson, Postpartum Depression, 29 J Reproductive
Medicine 113 (1984).
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form of the syndrome is postpartum psychosis, which strikes
roughly one in a thousand mothers.2 9 Psychosis usually appears
within the first three months, and most often within the first two
weeks after birth. 0 The symptoms are similar to those of any
psychotic reaction: confusion, fatigue, agitation, alterations in
mood, feelings of hopelessness and shame, delusions or auditory
hallucinations, hyperactivity, and rapid speech or mania."'
Both chronic depressive syndrome and postpartum psychosis
are observable and treatable.3 2 One medical journal recommends
that "a brief review of the most common symptoms of depression,
... should be undertaken as part of a routine postpartum visit."33
Following diagnosis, such symptoms can be treated with common
antidepressants or, if more serious symptoms appear, with elec-
troconvulsive treatment or major tranquilizers. "'
II. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS
California appellate courts have yet to address postpartum
psychosis. Although courts in other jurisdictions have admitted ev-
idence of postpartum psychosis for over 38 years,3" they have done
so without addressing the validity of the medical condition itself.36
Rather, courts, when confronted with the issue, generally have ac-
cepted the theoretical validity of the defense and admitted evi-
dence of the psychosis.3 7
19 Kruckman and Asmann-Finch, Postpartum Depression at xv (cited in note 2).
10 Id at xiv.
3' Garvey and Tollefson, 29 J Reproductive Medicine at 113 (cited in note 28).
32 Id.
3 Id.
" Id at 114-15.
" See, for example, People v Skeoch, 408 Ill 276, 96 NE2d 473, (1951) (holding that
evidence of postpartum psychosis was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the de-
fendant's sanity).
36 See, for example, State v White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P2d 797, (1969); Clark v Nevada,
588 P2d 1027, 95 Nev 24 (1979); Commonwealth v Comitz, 530 A2d 473, 365 Pa Super 599
(1987); State v Holden, 365 SE2d 626, 321 NC 689 (1988). In each of these cases, evidence of
.postpartum psychosis was admitted in support of an insanity defense. Not one of these
courts, however, questioned the admissibility of the evidence or the validity of the condition
itself.
'" Under the traditional M'Naghten test, a defendant must establish that her inability
to appreciate the difference between right and wrong resulted from a "mental disease or
defect." Generally, evidence of a syndrome can be admitted if the syndrome is "sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
Frye v United States, 293 F 1013, 1014 (DC App 1923). But see State v Kelly, 478 A2d 364,
381 n 19, 97 NJ 178 (1984) (declining to take judicial notice of battered spouse syndrome).
The general acceptance requirement of Frye has yet to pose a problem in the postpar-
tum psychosis context. California's statutory M'Naghten formulation does not include the
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Under the M'Naghten and the ALI formulations, postpartum
psychosis in theory should absolve a defendant of criminal respon-
sibility. Postpartum psychosis satisfies M'Naghten's cognitive
prong in that it can deprive a defendant of her ability to distin-
guish right from wrong at the time of her act. One expert testifying
in State v White, an Idaho case, reached this conclusion.3 8 Post-
partum psychosis also satisfies the volitional prong of the ALI for-
mulation, as it can deny a defendant the ability to conform her
activities to the requirements of the law. Both experts testifying in
White asserted this to be the case.3 9 If these conclusions are cor-
rect, and assuming that experts at a given trial concur, postpartum
psychosis victims should fare equally well under either the
M'Naghten or the ALI standard.4
Regardless of the test used, however, several practical
problems can prevent postpartum psychosis from providing a foun-
dation for a successful insanity defense in the full range of cases
where it is invoked. For example, juries may fear that they are
"letting the defendant off" by finding her not guilty by reason of
insanity.' Most insanity acquittees are hospitalized after acquittal;
postpartum psychosis acquittees, in contrast, theoretically require
no treatment, since the syndrome will have disappeared in the
years between the killing and the trial. 2 Accordingly, a defendant
acquitted as NGRI because of postpartum psychosis would go free
having received neither punishment nor treatment, exacerbating a
jury's fear that it is letting the defendant go "scot free."
In addition, postpartum psychosis presents more serious
problems of proof at trial than do other insanity defenses. Defend-
ants claiming forms of temporary insanity such as postpartum psy-
"mental disease or defect" requirement. See note 23.
1" 93 Idaho 153, 456 P2d 797, 799 (1969).
39 Id.
41 Experts, however, will not always agree, as illustrated in White, where one expert
found both the volitional and cognitive tests satisfied, while the other found only the voli-
tional prong satisfied. With the additional prong upon which to base their defense, defend-
ants in jurisdictions using the ALI formulation should have an increased chance for
acquittal.
" National Commission on the Insanity Defense, Myths & Realities: A Report of the
National Commission on the Insanity Defense 24-25 (National Mental Health Association,
1983). For a discussion of the validity of this concern, see Chapter 5 of Rita James Simon,
The Jury and the Defense of Insanity (Little, Brown, 1966) (concluding that jurors gener-
ally are aware of the consequences-including hospitalization of the defendant-of an
NGRI verdict).
,2 California Penal Code § 1026(a) specifies that insanity acquittees be confined to a
state mental hospital "unless it shall appear to the court that the sanity of the defendant
has been recovered fully."
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,chosis may not be able to invoke the legal presumptions which
favor and are available to the permanently insane."3 There is also a
problem of jury perception. Since postpartum psychosis occurs
within the first three months after childbirth, its symptoms will
have long disappeared by the time the murder trial begins." It is
extremely difficult to convince a jury that the rational defendant
before it was insane at the time of the crime. In the trial of Sheryl
Massip, for example, the jury found malice aforethought despite
strong psychological evidence to the contrary.45 And in Clark v Ne-
vada,'6 the appellate court concluded that substantial evidence of
the mother's calm manner before and after the killing was suffi-
cient to uphold her conviction.41
Finally, postpartum psychosis more often than not goes un-
diagnosed and untreated because adequate postnatal care is availa-
ble to only a small percentage of women. Adequate postpartum
care is considered essential to any woman's recovery from child-
birth; a psychological evaluation can be a standard feature of such
care. 48 Moreover, while postpartum psychosis is relatively simple to
diagnose and treat,'9 the manifestations of the psychosis are diffi-
cult to ignore. Several commentators have noted that "[a] non-
43 Specifically, the presumption of insanity at the time of the crime may not be
invoked:
Proof that defendant was afflicted with a permanent insanity, as distinguished
from a temporary or transient insanity, prior to the commission of the crime
charged will ... dispel the presumption of sanity and raise a presumption that his
insanity continued to exist until the time of the commission of the crime.
In re Dennis, 51 Cal 2d 666, 335 P2d 657, 661 (1959) (emphasis added). In Clark v Nevada,
95 Nev 24, 588 P2d 1027 (1979), the defendant "alleged temporary, not permanent, insanity
and consequently the jury found her evidence, whether controverted or uncontroverted...
was nevertheless insufficient to dispel the presumption." Id at 1030.
," See pp 361-62. This problem may be common to other forms of temporary insanity,
and the solution proposed here may therefore be equally applicable to these contexts. This
comment, however, does not address such other forms of temporary insanity, the durations
of which may be less readily definable.
" The judge considered the jury's finding so clearly contrary to the evidence that he
took the highly unusual step of overturning a criminal conviction. Lichtblau, LA Times at 1
(cited in note 1).
4" 95 Nev 24, 588 P2d 1027 (1979).
" 588 P2d at 1030.
48 Psychological follow-up has been recommended as a standard element of any post-
partum care program, one that is "of primary prevention of mental health problems."
Michael Harris, Paediatric Communications With the Post-Partum Patient, 1976 Med J of
Australia, 417, 420 (1976). Such evaluation requires no hospitalization or expert psychologi-
cal care; it can be performed over the telephone by nursing staff. See, for example, the
program described in Nancy Donaldson, Fourth Trimester Follow-Up, 1977 Am J Nursing
1176 (1976). Nurses can then refer a patient to psychiatric care if she shows signs of depres-




pregnant patient who manifested these physiologic changes [that
is, the normal effects of childbirth] would immediately be a candi-
date for intensive care."5 Women who receive either no or inade-
quate postpartum care are at greater risk of suffering from post-
partum psychosis and, paradoxically, will probably lack the
psychological evidence necessary to meet their burden of proof in
any ensuing trial.51
III. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE DEFENSE OF POSTPARTUM
PSYCHOSIS: ALTER THE BURDEN OF PROOF
There are a number of possible approaches to the problems of
proof under the insanity defense in the context of postpartum psy-
chosis. One is to enact legislation, such as that currently pending
in the California Senate, providing public education and special
training to help law enforcement and correctional officials identify
postpartum psychosis sufferers.2 While this proposal is commend-
able, and may help prevent infanticides, it does little to help the
postpartum psychosis defendant accused of committing a criminal
act,53 as it altogether fails to address the problems of proving in-
sanity at trial.
A second alternative is the creation of a distinct category of
crimes committed by postpartum psychosis sufferers. Great Brit-
ain, for example, created such a separate class of crimes. In 1938, a
statute was enacted in Great Britain mitigating the punishment of
mothers who killed their children as a result of "the effect of giving
birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent
upon the birth of the child." ' The statute defines this crime as
50 Carole Ann McKenzie, Mary Elizabeth Canaday, and Elizabeth Carroll, Comprehen-
sive Care During the Postpartum Period, 17 Nursing Clinics of North America 23, 28
(1982).
81 In Clark, for example, the defendant introduced evidence of a psychiatric examina-
tion, but because this examination occurred over a year after the homicide, the court ruled
that it was properly entitled to lesser weight. Clark, 588 P2d at 1029.
52 Eric Lichtblau, Massip Ruling Seen As Boost for Postpartum Education, LA Times
2 (Dec 25, 1988).
" The bill was introduced in 1988 by Senator Robert Presley (D-Riverside), who also
created a task force of specialists to study the problem in 1987. The bill's focus on education
rather than law reform was intentional. Michael Pinkerton, a deputy state attorney general
who served on Presley's task force explained: "I believe that current laws can adequately
handle the issue-under our insanity and diminished capacity defenses-if people under-
stand the disorder." Id. California, however, no longer recognizes a diminished capacity de-
fense. See note 23.
" The Infanticide Act (Statutes in Force-Criminal Law: 39:4-1 (1938)) provides:
(1) Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child
being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omis-
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"infanticide," a separate class of homicide, and reduces its degree
from murder to manslaughter.
Although this approach recognizes that a postpartum killing
may not constitute murder, adoption in the United States would
pose several problems. First, a reduction in grade is logically incon-
sistent with most criminal homicide codes. For example, in Califor-
nia, murder is defined according to the traditional common law
standard of malice aforethought;" manslaughter is characterized
as a killing that is voluntary-in "heat of passion" or upon provo-
cation-or involuntary-in the commission either of a nonfeloni-
ous but an unlawful act, or of a lawful act performed in an unlaw-
ful manner, or resulting from a lack of "due caution or
circumspection." 56 According to this description, putting a child on
the street pavement and running him or her over with a car is
clearly murder. The act is not the, result of heat of passion or prov-
ocation, and it would be absurd to characterize the driver as acting
"without due caution or circumspection." Such an act instead
shows "an abandoned and malignant heart," and hence constitutes
sion the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully re-
covered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of
lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the
circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would have amounted to
murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such of-
fence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of man-
slaughter of the child.
(2) Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder of her child, being a child
under the age of twelve months, the jury are of opinion that she by any wilful act
or omission caused its death, but that at the time of the act or omission the bal-
ance of her mind was disturbed by her not having fully recovered from the effect
of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon
the birth of the child, then the jury may, notwithstanding that the circumstances
were such that but for the provisions of this Act they might have returned a ver-
dict of murder, return in lieu thereof a verdict of infanticide.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall affect the power of the jury upon an indictment
for the murder of a child to return a verdict of manslaughter, or a verdict of guilty
but insane ....
"' California Penal Code § 187 defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human be-
ing, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." Section 189 classifies felony murder and specific
other murders as first degree; all other murders are of the second degree.
" California Penal Code § 192 provides:
§ 192. Manslaughter; voluntary, involuntary, and vehicular ...
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of
three kinds:
(a) Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
(b) Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to fel-
ony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlaw-
ful manner, or without due caution and circumspection ....
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the implied malice sufficient for murder.6 7 Under California's stat-
utory scheme, the commission of the act is either murder or the
behavior of an insane person.58
The British solution is subject to a second, more fundamental
objection. Although it purportedly does not foreclose an insanity
acquittal, it effectively gives the jury the "correct disposition" by
creating a crime fit specifically for this category of factual scena-
rios. The existence of the crime of infanticide permits the jury to
characterize the mother as cracking under the pressure of raising a
newborn and, in recognition of this impaired mental state, to miti-
gate her punishment while still holding her criminally responsi-
ble." As the above discussion shows, however, a mother who kills
while suffering from postpartum psychosis is not less criminally re-
sponsible than a murderer; she is not criminally responsible at
all.e0
A solution that better suits our legal system and more closely
accommodates the nature of the defendant's condition reduces the
burden of proof imposed upon defendants who claim that they ac-
ted while suffering from postpartum psychosis. States are free to
choose how heavy a burden of proof to place on the defendant.61
Currently, states, in choosing their standards for NGRI acquittal,
select one from at least three options: (1) the defendant is required
simply to raise a reasonable doubt as to her sanity; (2) she must
51 California Penal Code § 188 states:
[MIalice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a delib-
erate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied,
when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending
the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."
58 Similarly, § 210.2 of the Model Penal Code defines murder as purposeful or knowing
killing, or a reckless act with extreme indifference to human life. Section 210.3 defines man-
slaughter as a reckless act, or a purposeful or knowing act committed under extreme mental
or emotional disturbance. The definition of negligent homicide in § 210.4 is self-explanatory.
All the mental states are to be determined from the actor's position. See Model Penal Code,
Explanatory Comments § 210.2 (at 20) and § 210.3 (at 49). Sheryl Massip's act could hardly
be characterized as "reckless" or "negligent." As an alternative to the characterization under
the California statutory scheme, however, her act might be labeled as purposeful, though
under extreme emotional disturbance.
"9 The punishment for infanticide, which by definition occurs under circumstances that
but for the statute would constitute murder, is equivalent to that for manslaughter. See note
54.
"0 Additionally, the British statute only applies to homicide prosecutions. It therefore
provides no defense for other violent crimes that a postpartum psychosis victim might com-
mit, such as assault.
", The United States Constitution does not prohibit states from requiring defendants to
prove that they were insane when they committed a criminal act. See pp 368-73 for a discus-
sion of constitutional limitations.
3551
368 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was insane; or
(3) she must prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was
insane. Because of the unique problems of proof in the postpartum
psychosis context, states should adopt standards which impose a
lower burden of proof on defendants in this context than on de-
fendants claiming other forms of insanity.
A. Burden of Proof and the Insanity Defense
At common law it is presumed that all defendants are sane.
The court in M'Naghten described this presumption in the follow-
ing manner:
[E]very man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a suf-
ficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes,
until the contrary be proved to [the jury's] satisfaction.2
Under the M'Naghten standard, in other words, a defendant car-
ries the burden of proving that he was insane at the time of his
criminal act. This allocation of the burden of proof became, as did
the M'Naghten insanity test, part of the common law. 3
In 1895, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Davis v United
States6' that requiring the defendant to prove his insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence was impermissible in' the federal
courts. Such an approach, the Court reasoned, allowed the jury to
convict a defendant when it reasonably doubted his sanity, and
therefore had a reasonable doubt as to his criminal responsibility.6 5
The result of a preponderance standard was "in effect to require
[the defendant] to establish his innocence by proving that he is not
guilty of the crime charged." 6
The Davis holding is important in two respects. It did not re-
ject the presumption of sanity outright. Absent this presumption,
the prosecution would have to affirmatively prove sanity in every
case, even if the issue was not raised. Such a task "would seriously
delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime,
" M'Naghten, 10 Cl & F at 210.
" "The law presumes that every one charged with crime is sane, and thus supplies in
the first instance the required proof of capacity to commit crime." Davis v United States,
160 US 469, 486 (1895).
04 160 US 469, 471 (1895).
6 The defendant "is entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if, upon all
the evidence, there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of committing crime."
Id at 484.
11 Id at 487.
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and in most cases be unnecessary." 7 The defendant therefore can
at least be required to raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.8
At that point, however, the prosecution must assume the burden of
proving sanity; it cannot require the defendant to produce further
evidence to prove insanity by a preponderance.8 9
The Court also did not decide Davis on constitutional
grounds.7 0 The holding instead rested on "principles fundamental
in criminal law.., the recognition and enforcement of which are
demanded by every consideration of humanity and justice. 7 1 Ac-
cordingly, the result of Davis applied only as a rule of decision for
the federal courts72 and did not address the issue of limits on state
power to impose the burden of proof of insanity on a criminal
defendant.
Fifty-four years later, the Court addressed this question in Le-
land v Oregon." In Leland, the Court upheld an Oregon statute
requiring a criminal defendant claiming insanity to prove it be-
yond a reasonable doubt, rejecting the argument that such a bur-
den violated due process.7" Because the presumption of sanity was
rational, it was, according to the Court, constitutionally permissi-
ble.75 Justice Frankfurter dissented, likening the decision to "me-
dieval law."' "7 Although he objected to the reasonable doubt stan-
dard, he admitted that a presumption of sanity should operate at
some level,77 and did not explicitly agree with the majority's con-
clusion that a preponderance standard was impermissible. Instead,
he contrasted Oregon's reasonable doubt standard with the pre-
ponderance standard used at the time by twenty other states, im-
67 Id at 486.
8 "[Wihere the case made by the prosecution discloses nothing whatever in excuse or
extenuation of the crime charged, the accused is bound to produce some evidence that will
impair or weaken the force of the legal presumption in favor of sanity." Id.
69 Id.
70 Patterson v New York, 432 US 197, 203 (1977) ("Davis was not a constitutional rul-
ing .... ")
7' Davis, 160 US at 493.
72 As noted some years later by the Court, Davis "obviously establishes no constitu-
tional doctrine, but only the rule to be followed in federal courts." Leland v Oregon, 343 US
790, 797 (1952).
73 Id.
71 Id at 798-99.
76 Id at 799, citing Tot v United States, 319 US 463 (1943) (striking down a presump-
tion in which "the fact ... required to be presumed had no rational connection with the fact
which, when proven, set the presumption in operation").
71 Leland, 343 US at 803 (Frankfurter dissenting).
71 Id at 804.
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plying that such a preponderance standard was acceptable.7"
Leland settled the quantum of proof issue until the Court's
landmark decision, In re Winship,7 9 constitutionalized the reason-
able doubt standard in criminal prosecutions.80 The Court, refer-
ring directly (and exclusively) to Davis and to Frankfurter's dis-
sent in Leland, concluded that "it has long been assumed that
proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitu-
tionally required."8 Because the Court in Winship used the rea-
soning from Davis and the Leland dissent to determine that the
reasonable doubt standard was constitutionally required, one could
infer that the results which that reasoning produced in Davis and
Leland were likewise constitutionally required.
This reading of Winship was bolstered by a later case, Mulla-
ney v Wilbur,8 2 which struck down a Maine statute requiring a de-
fendant to prove heat of passion or sudden provocation in order to
reduce a murder charge to manslaughter." The Court noted that
because the state "affirmatively shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant . . . the defendant [was] required to prove the critical
fact in dispute."8" And since a defendant might not always be able
to prove such critical facts for practical reasons unrelated to his
guilt or innocence, the shift contemplated in the Maine statute op-
erated to "increase further the likelihood of an erroneous murder
conviction." 85
The Court in Mullaney highlighted two points that are of par-
ticular significance in the insanity context. First, the Court explic-
itly rejected the argument that the defendant should carry the bur-
"' "Unlike every other State . . . Oregon says that the accused person must satisfy a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that, being incapable of committing murder, he has not
committed murder." Id at 805.
79 397 US 358 (1970).
80 The Court emphasized the necessity of this standard of proof:
It is ... important in our free society that every individual going about his ordi-
nary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty.
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasona-
ble-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
Id at 364.
81 Id at 362.
82 421 US 684 (1975).
13 Id at 703-04.




den simply because he has better access to information about his
mental state.8 6 Second, it also disagreed with the contention that
the state should not have to "prove a negative," that is, prove that
the defendant did not have a certain mental state.8 7 As this reason-
ing appeared to suggest that the prosecution had to bear the bur-
den of proof on every element, even those that might be particu-
larly difficult, some commentators thought Mullaney signalled the
fall of Leland.5
The general holding in Mullaney, however, has proved diffi-
cult to grasp. Its narrow holding is easier to identify: The prosecu-
tion must prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden prov-
ocation beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant raises the
issue." Yet, in a seemingly contradictory holding in Patterson v
New York,90 the Court upheld a New York statute designating "ex-
treme emotional disturbance" as an affirmative defense to murder.
Extreme emotional disturbance is essentially a reformulation of
the "heat of passion" defense used in Mullaney.91 Addressing the
apparent contradiction with Mullaney, the Court in Patterson
noted that "[t]here is some language in Mullaney that has been
understood as perhaps construing the Due Process Clause to re-
quire the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact
affecting 'the degree of criminal culpability,'" but dismissed that
interpretation, saying that "[t]he Court did not intend Mullaney
to have such far-reaching effect. ' '92
Whatever the theoretical inconsistencies between Mullaney
and Patterson, it appears today that Mullaney does not reach the
86 [A]ithough intent is typically considered a fact within the knowledge of the defend-
ant, this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify shifting the burden to him." 421
US at 702.
87 "Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique in our system of criminal juris-
prudence. Maine itself requires the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defense beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id.
88 See, for example, Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of
Proof of Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 BU L Rev 499, 500 (1976).
8' "We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when
the issue is properly presented in a homicide case." Mullaney, 421 US at 704.
90 432 US 197 (1977).
81 "This defense is a considerably expanded version of the common-law defense of heat
of passion on sudden provocation." Id at 202.
"' Id at 215 n 15. Justice Powell, author of the Court's opinion in Mullaney, dissented
in Patterson, calling the majority's approach "indefensibly formalistic." Id at 224 (Powell
dissenting). He interpreted Mullaney to hold that the prosecution must bear the burden of
proof for any element that makes a "substantial difference in punishment of the offender
and in the stigma associated with the conviction" and that has historically constituted an
element of the crime. Id at 226.
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insanity defense.93 Patterson largely stopped whatever momentum
Winship and Mullaney might have generated toward overturning
Leland. As a result, two circuits have upheld the constitutionality
of the federal insanity statute,9 4 despite its use of a "clear and con-
vincing" standard.6
The line of cases from Davis through Patterson does not im-
pose constitutional restrictions on states in choosing whether and
to what extent to shift the burden of proof of insanity to the de-
fendant. Davis and its progeny do, however, put forth policy con-
siderations as guidelines for shifting the burden. Two tests for per-
missible burden-shifting have emerged from these considerations:
the "rational connection" test and the "relative convenience"
test.96
The rational connection test is premised on the same rationale
as that in Winship: The State must minimize the risk, within rea-
son, of convicting innocent defendants.9 7 Suppose that, to convict a
defendant, a state must prove three elements, A, B, and C. The
rational connection test permits the state to create a presumption
of C-that is, shift the burden of proof of C to the defend-
ant-whenever proving A and B makes C sufficiently likely.' The
stronger the correlation between elements A, B, and C, the more
stringent the standard of proof that can be imposed on the defend-
ant. In effect, as the strength of connection required increases, the
risk of convicting innocent defendants simultaneously increases.
The relative convenience test considers the parties' relative ac-
cess to information concerning the element to be proved. Justice
91 Then-Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Mullaney makes exactly this point:
I agree with the Court that In re Winship does require that the prosecution prove
beyond a reasonable doubt every element which constitutes the crime charged
against a defendant. I see no inconsistency between that holding and the holding
of Leland v. Oregon.
Mullaney, 421 US at 705 (Rehnquist, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
" See note 15.
"4 United States v Amos, 803 F2d 419 (8th Cir 1986); United States v Freeman, 804
F2d 1574 (11th Cir 1986). Ironically, this federal standard is precisely the standard rejected
in Davis, a decision central to the Winship decision.
" Harold A. Ashford and D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due
Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L J 165, 166 (1969). Although
the Court has not subscribed to Ashford and Risinger's constitutional arguments, it has
cited this article as providing a framework for the burden of proof analysis. See, for exam-
ple, Mullaney, 421 US 702-03 n 31.
" "We submit that a standard of precision approaching 99%, and certainly greater
than 90%, should be required before a presumption can be constitutionally sustained con-
sistent with notions of due process." Ashford and Risinger, 79 Yale L J at 183 (cited in note
96).
". Id at 184.
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Cardozo developed the test's most famous formulation:
For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that
the evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister
significance ... or, if this at times be lacking, there must
be in any event a manifest disparity in convenience of
proof and opportunity for knowledge. 9
Thus, the test measures how easily a defendant can rebut the pre-
sumption considered by the connection test, without comparing
the prosecution and defendant's relative ease of access to informa-
tion. 100 The harder it is for a defendant to rebut the presumption
(regardless of how difficult it would have been for the prosecution
to establish the presumed fact), the greater the danger that inno-
cent defendants will be convicted.1 '
B. A Proposed Burden of Proof for Postpartum Psychosis
The unique circumstances under which postpartum psychosis
arises, and the problems of proof it presents, suggest that defend-
ants claiming this insanity defense should carry a reduced burden
of proof. California currently imposes on the defendant the burden
of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.'0 2 Al-
though this burden is perfectly constitutional,'0 " it renders an in-
sanity defense illusory for postpartum psychosis defendants.0 4 To
account for the special context of postpartum psychosis, the bur-
den of proof in jurisdictions like California should be modified to
read as follows:
gg Morrison v California, 291 US 82, 90 (1933) (citations omitted). Morrison involved a
California statute that prohibited aliens from owning farmland. The statute required the
state to prove possession of the land and the defendant, in order to gain acquittal, to prove
citizenship (or eligibility for citizenship). Justice Cardozo ruled that a shift in the burden of
proof may be acceptable "where the balance of convenience can be redressed without op-
pression to the defendant through the same procedural expedient." Id at 91. For the shift
involved in the case, however, "[tlhere [could] be no escape from hardship and injustice,
outweighing many times any procedural convenience, unless the burden of persuasion in
respect of racial origin [was] cast upon the people." Id at 96.
0 Ashford and Risinger explain:
One thing not relevant in this inquiry is whether the defendant's burden is five or
five thousand times lighter than that lifted from the prosecution. The percentage
of innocent defendants that will be convicted pursuant to a presumption will in no
way be affected by the difficulty which the prosecution might have in proving its
case absent the presumption.
Ashford and Risinger, 79 Yale L J at 186 (cited in note 96).
101 Id.
102 Cal Penal Code § 25(b).
101 See pp 368-73.
104 See pp 363-65.
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In any criminal proceeding, including any juvenile court
proceeding, in which a plea of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier
of fact only when the accused person proves by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of
knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his
or her act, or, if the accused person is a mother who
committed the act within three months of giving birth,
when she raises a reasonable doubt as to whether she
was capable of knowing or understanding the nature
and quality of her act, and that he or she was incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the
commission of the offense.
An analysis under the rational connection test reveals that the
presumption of sanity cannot apply equally to all defendants
claiming insanity. Ordinarily, the presumption of sanity is so
strong that it does not compel proof of any independent facts; in
other words, the state can invoke the presumption of sanity with-
out proving any elements of a particular crime. By contrast, in a
case involving a mother who commits a criminal act (such as mur-
der) within three months of giving birth to a child is less likely to
be sane at the time of the crime than a defendant identical in all
respects but one-that of having recently given birth.105 The pre-
sumption of sanity in this situation is not as strong; the state
should therefore not impose as heavy a burden of proof on the
postpartum psychosis defendant.
As discussed earlier, it is more difficult for a postpartum psy-
chosis defendant to rebut the presumption of sanity than it is for
other defendants. The relative convenience analysis thus suggests
that because the danger of convicting innocent defendants is un-
justifiably increased, a reduced standard of proof is needed. 106
Once a reasonable doubt is raised, the prosecution may be able to
10 See pp 361-62 for a discussion of the symptoms and frequency of postpartum
psychosis.
"0 One commentator has argued that the state has an affirmative duty to provide a
prompt psychiatric evaluation as soon as possible after an offense. Because a defendant's
mental condition can change rapidly, failure to provide such an examination may effectively
deny the defendant access to the insanity defense, and therefore violate due process. Note,
Due Process Concerns With Delayed Psychiatric Evaluations and the Insanity Defense:
Time Is of the Essence, 64 BU L Rev 861 (1984). This argument applies with added force in
the postpartum psychosis context, where the defendant's mental condition may change dra-
matically within days of the offense, and supplies another reason to lower the burden on the
defendant (and correspondingly raise the burden on the state).
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prove sanity by using available medical testimony since mothers
for whom medical data is available most likely received adequate
postpartum care.1"7
This proposed approach reduces the risk of convicting inno-
cent defendants without simultaneously increasing the probability
that sane and cognizant defendants will go free. Although the pro-
posed standard reduces the burden of proof on women who re-
cently gave birth, it does not dispose of the presumption of sanity
altogether. The statistical frequency of postpartum psychosis sug-
gests that a woman who has very recently given birth is less likely
to be sane than a woman who has not; in recognition of this fact,
the state should require of the former group of women a lesser bur-
den of proof. Such women, however, are nonetheless ordinarily
sane, and the legal presumption of sanity should continue to oper-
ate, though with a reduced burden of rebuttal on the defendant.
Because the fact that the defendant recently gave birth is taken
into account in the reduced burden of proof, the defendant claim-
ing insanity by reason of postpartum psychosis will not be freed by
the proposed standard from the requirement of introducing further
evidence to meet the reduced burden.10 8
CONCLUSION
Under both the M'Naghten and ALI insanity tests, a defend-
ant can theoretically claim postpartum psychosis as the basis for
an insanity defense. But temporary insanity generally and postpar-
tum psychosis in particular pose unique problems of proof inappli-
cable to other insanity defendants. The common law presumption
of sanity therefore operates with less force in the postpartum psy-
chosis context. Imposing the same burdens of proof on postpartum
psychosis defendants as on other insanity defendants therefore vio-
lates the traditional policy considerations that guide such an impo-
sition. The burden of proof imposed on such defendants should
therefore be reduced.
107 Many defendants, of course, will not have received adequate postpartum care. The
state's corresponding inability to counter the raised doubt with contemporaneous medical
testimony creates an incentive for the state to provide adequate postpartum care, possibly
reducing the initial occurrence of postpartum psychosis. At the very least, it creates an in-
centive to provide immediate psychological evaluation upon arrest.
'08 Such evidence could take the form of medical testimony or, if such testimony is
unavailable, observations by family members or acquaintances that the defendant behaved
in a manner consistent with postpartum psychosis. In Skeoch, for example, testimony from
the defendant's husband and a psychiatrist was held sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's sanity. People v Skeoch, 408 111 276, 96 NE2d 473, 475 (1951).
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